Hi there! Welcome to Refined Insights, the newsletter where I explore the emerging trends and topics of our era and dispel the hype where I can. So, welcome, sit back, and enjoy.
War: A dispute between two toothless men over dental floss.
One of the first things they teach you as a new poker player is to avoid bluffing as much as you can. After all, at the end of the day, a bluff is ultimately a sign of weakness, an acknowledgment that the game has not gone well for you.
But there is another more important reason: bluffs expire as a good strategy pretty quickly. If you are bluffing all the time, you are not bluffing at all, in as much as the point is to convince your opponent you have a good hand.
In his memorable book of anecdotes, Predatory Thinking, Dave Trott writes:
When I was at art school in New York, I knew a guy who was there on the GI Bill of Rights.
This meant he served his time in the armed forces, so Uncle Sam paid for him to go to college.
This guy had been a lieutenant in Vietnam. He told me they had a high mortality rate among lieutenants.
One of the main reasons for this was ‘fragging’. Fragging wasn’t enemy action. It was your own troops.
What would happen is this.A gung-ho lieutenant would arrive from the States.
He’d be desperate to prove himself, so he’d pick all the most dangerous missions for himself and his men.
Obviously the men didn’t like this. The troops were all enlisted and only had to survive their two-year stint.
They weren’t going to do this by taking unnecessary risks. So they would give him a warning.
When he pulled the blankets off his bed that night, there would be a fragmentation grenade lying there.
As this was only a warning, the pin would still be in it. So it wouldn’t explode.
Of course, if he ignored the warning, the next time it wouldn’t have the pin in. So the only thing stopping it exploding was the weight of the blanket.
And when he flipped the blanket back he, and the evidence, would disappear.
Ofcourse, that only happened to lieutenants who didn’t listen to the warning. But it did happen.
The lieutenants that died were the price the soldiers had to pay for the threat to be effective.
That's the thing with bluffs and threats: they have got to materialize at some point. Threaten me once and it's scary. Threaten me twice and it's an irritation.
This brings us to the most important threat/bluff of the century: Vladimir Putin's somewhat vague threats to authorize a nuclear strike on Ukraine. It's not the first time Russia's Dictator-In-Chief has reminded the world that Russia is a nuclear power, perhaps the nuclear power. It might not be the last either. But it is certainly looking like the most legitimate.
In other words, Putin means business, and when that business is the annihilation of the entire moral and political order that has scaffolded our entire lives, that business is everyone's business.
I have generally steered clear on this substack and elsewhere of discussing the Ukraine war. A good rule of thumb in life is to ignore situations you cannot control. Also, this might be the least morally ambiguous war since 1945: there are good guys fighting for their survival and bad guys fighting to take it away. Moral clarity is many things but it is hardly fertile ground for discussion.
And unlike many who apparently did, I did not become a full fledged military expert overnight in February and onwards.
But there is something rather concerning about the way mainstream media is treating this ongoing crisis. I have seen generally three categories of response.
There are some who have dismissed the nuclear threat altogether because it is the last gasp of a failing power determined to make a little noise before it finally exits the global stage. These two statements might be true but the because joining them together is so not doing the job they think it is doing. A failing power determined to make noise( which Russia absolutely is) would rather go out with the loudest noise of all: a boom. Literally.
The second category is made up of those who are freaking the hell out and are now making all kinds of comparison to the Cuban Missile Crisis. Among these people is president Biden himself, who last week warned of Armageddon and said that we have never been as close to nuclear war since the Cuban Missile Crisis. Biden is in crowded company here. There are now a host of articles on the Cuban Missile Crisis drawing subtle and not so subtle similarities to what's going on right now.
And the third category is made up of people who have reacted to Putin's escalations by conducting an assessment of Russia's nuclear capabilities in favour of their own desires conclusion. Normally, this is fine. But this ain't normally. Russia has nearly six thousand weapons of mass destruction. To suggest that all of them and their delivery systems will fail to work is a fantasy Walt Disney would be proud of.
What unites all of these people is their insistence that Ukraine continues to receive financial and military support, which makes all the moral sense in the world but not a lick of logical coherence, at least for the latter two categories. If you think that a nuclear crisis is possible and you keep supporting the only thing right now that makes it possible, well, your support does not compute.
There is, of course, a counterargument to this point which has gained in popularity lately. The thrust of it is that allowing a nuclear power to waltz its way to victory simply because it is a nuclear power is itself a form of nuclear escalation and so appeasement of Russia should be off the table.
It implies that if Russia can try this once and get away with it, it can do so again.
But Russia has had nuclear weapons since 1949, and save a few isolated incidents, has never demonstrated an actual intent to use them. Putin has been in control of Russia since 1999, and has never resorted to express threats of nuclear war until now.
If Russia or Putin wanted to play the game of take as much territory as possible through nuclear threats, they could have done so long, long ago. It’s not about the nuclear weapons. That has been a constant in Putin's regime for twenty three years. It is about Ukraine.
For what it’s worth, I disagree with each of these categories. And it's necessary to point out something else: mainstram media and opinion have been consistently wrong throughout this war.
When Putin announced his declaration of intent in his rambling speech last year, it was roundly ignored.
When Russian soldiers were stationed on Ukraine's borders very early this year, it was mostly dismissed as grandiose posturing.
When Russia attacked Ukraine in February, the reaction was widespread shock and surprise. Pretty much only those who initiated the attack saw it coming; hardly anyone shorted the ruble in anticipation anyway.
Putin himself and many other analysts expected the war to be over in a matter of weeks. As late as May, when the contours of the conflict began to assume clarity, the New York Times was still dutifully parroting this narrative.
So, the prequel, the beginning, and the ongoing middle of this war have been a complete surprise, even to the most educated of observers. This is not to indict anyone: it's easy to predict how the book ends when you have already read the last chapter.
But we have the benefit of hindsight or should at least have it now. So, why are we repeating the same mistakes. Nothing about this war suggests that we can figure out what's going to happen next. So, why are so many acting like they do.
Why is mainstream media pushing its preferred narrative that Ukraine will win this war when all its previous narratives on the war turned out to be flat-out wrong.
Again, this is a request for epistemic humility from everyone involved. We don't know how this ends and we especially don't know that it will end the way we want it to. That should be the premise underlining all dialogue on this conflict. Beyond that, we can only make informed guesses.
No, This is not the Cuban Missile Crisis.
The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 was not our closest flirtation with nuclear Armageddon. That would be the far less known incident of Stanislav Petrov in 1983. But it was certainly our most openly close flirtation. People had been expecting things to boil over for decades. They had history on their side too
Never in western history at least had two major powers existed in the same era and not went to war for supremacy. The British, the Fergie-Era Manchester United of their day, went to war with the Spanish, the Dutch, and the French when each of these nations were archrival powers. The two world wars happened as well. In that light, a conflict between America and the Soviet Union seemed inescapable.
1962 almost proved them right. Khrushchev and Kennedy and their aides took the world to the brink of nuclear collapse, and in the finest hour of international diplomacy, rescued it from the brink again. Yet as intriguing as the Cuban Missile Crisis was, this is not Part 2.
The Cuban Missile Crisis was a battle for international supremacy between two nuclear powers at the peak of their capacities. Everything about it was premeditated and deliberate. It almost went out of hand, of course, because they were still actual human beings with troublesome motives like revenge and retribution, but it was rather like a high stakes game of chess. In hindsight, because of this, the Cuban Missile Crisis was probably not as dangerous as it seemed at the time.
In their essay on the nuclear crisis, Policy Tensor, whose essay I recommend by the way, have borrowed a term from chess and called what we currently face a nuclear zugzwang: a situation in which the obligation to make a move in one's turn is a serious, often decisive, disadvantage.
The image this calls up is of two equally matched players at a game where the slightest edge is fatal and anything beyond that will terminate in decisive victory.
Unintentionally or not, this recalls the Cuban Missile Crisis as the historical analogy to what is going on today. But this is a mistake. A mistake, it seems, that many are intent on making, because there's nothing going on today that is similar to the Cuban Missile Crisis, except for the obvious missile part. This is not a game of high stakes chess. It is a game of high stakes poker. And its historical parallel, in my opinion, is with an event which was far, far more disastrous.
Hiroshima and Nagasaki
If there is anything that makes a mathematician's day, it is discovering a non obvious similarity. Mathematics, to a large degree, is finding and proving hidden similarities. Two problems which appear to be very different actually often turn out to be the same.
For instance, sudoku, The traveling salesman problem, arranging the optimal number of chips on a circuit, protein folding, tetris, and many others, are all the same problem. They are all NP complete. This means if you solve any of them by finding a general solution to all instances that scales in polynomial time, you have solved all of them, and possibly made yourself the most influential person alive.
With history, it is very different. There are no exactitudes. You can't prove that the events of the fall of the Berlin Wall are the same as that of the Iranian Revolution occuring right now. For one thing, they involve different people in different periods with different cultures. For this reason, history can never be scientific, let alone mathematical.
But we can approximate. In a wider sense, they are both demands for freedom against an autocratic government, although one is primarily about political freedom and the other is primarily about religious freedom.
Finding the right historical analogy is important because history is the record of how people no dumber or worse than us messed things up, so we can learn ( not really) not to mess things up again.
And so, what this all really reminds me of is Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the only time in human history when nuclear weapons were used on people. This sounds like an exaggerated example to inspire fear and attention. So, how do I believe this. Let me count the ways
First, we have a nuclear power in a war against a non nuclear power. America was the only nuclear power in the world at the time and Japan was not a nuclear power then and still isn't till today.
Similarly, Russia is a nuclear power and Ukraine, in a rather unfortunate series of events which will put Lemony Snicket to shame, is not a nuclear power.
Then, we have a war in which the nuclear power is struggling in conventional battles with conventional weapons.
American casualties reached a monthly high of 88 thousand soldiers. The losses were so significant that drafting women into the army, an unpopular move at the time, was strongly considered.
Although Russian losses today are not on that scale, Russia is losing quite badly especially since the Ukrainian counter offensive, and has initiated a massive and unpopular military draft in addition.
Then, we have the underestimation of the opposing forces by the nuclear power.
In early 1941, one of the battalion commanders of the Allied forces in the war had lamented, 'Don't you think (our men) are worthy of some better enemy than the Japanese.' In the same way, Russia and Putin severely underestimated the resolve of the Ukrainian army and its people. It is a given that the war would have been conducted differently or perhaps not at all if Russia knew then what it knows now.
Then, we have the desire to send a message to a great rival and the world at large. The total costs of the atomic weapons was 2 billion dollars. Surprisingly enough, with that sum, America could have bought enough planes and bombs to enact just as much physical damage and loss of life on Japan, if damaging Japan was the only point of the nuclear strike, that is.
America clearly had another more important reason. As Guy Alperovitz documents in his book, The Decision To Use The Atomic Bomb, Hiroshima and Nagasaki were also a message to the rest of the world. Hitler's Germany had fallen. Britain and France had sustained serious losses and would clearly not be the same. And the Soviet Union had played the decisive role in taking down Hitler's German army.
The atomic bomb was America's message, loud and clear, to the rest of the world that it was not only the preeminent power on the global arena but that all its possible rivals should not have bothered trying.
Today, Russia feels threatened and left behind both in Europe and the world at large. My guess is the war wasn't about NATO expansion per se so much as what it communicated on an emotional level to Putin and his generals. Russia wants to remind the world and America that it is still a great power. It is not but the belief is what matters here. The price for sustaining that illusion could be very steep indeed.
Finally and most importantly, the nuclear power is in a war of attrition against a weaker but resolute enemy who refused to give up.
Imperial Japan, while being considerably outmatched, fought bravely against America and her allies. One of its favourite strategies in the twilight of the war were kamikaze pilots: pilots who would load up their planes with explosives and crash into enemy naval vessels in what was a guaranteed suicide mission.
The Kamikaze pilots killed over seven thousand naval personnel and destroyed over seventy ships. To avoid a prolonged war with increasing American losses, and with popular opinion for the war waning back home, America authorized the nuclear strikes. Between 129 thousand and 230 thousand people died in the nuclear annihilation, half of that number in the very first day. It had the intended effect: Japan surrendered six days later.
Ukraine's bravery in this war is not in doubt. Despite being outmatched in materiel and ammunition, the Ukrainians have fought with tenacity, intelligence, and commitment. As Russian losses escalate and popular opinion for the war sours in Russia, the temptation for nuclear war grows ever more attractive.
Tadamichi Kuribayashi, Japan's esteemed general who led its war efforts and eventually died in the war, wrote a set of widely distributed promises to energize his troops. Volodymyr Zelensky, the president of Ukraine, has used his considerable talents in speech making and writing to inspire his own troops.
What's the big difference between this from Zelensky:
Without gas or without you? Without you.
Without light or without you? Without you.
Without water or without you? Without you.
Without food or without you? Without you.
Cold, hunger, darkness and thirst are not as scary and deadly for us as your 'friendship and brotherhood,
But history will put everything in its place. And we will be with gas, light, water and food ... and WITHOUT you!"
And this from Tadamichi:
1. We shall defend this island with all our strength to the end.
2. We shall fling ourselves against the enemy tanks clutching explosives to destroy them.
3. We shall slaughter the enemy, dashing in among them to kill them.
4. Every one of our shots shall be on target and kill the enemy.
5. We shall not die until we have killed ten of the enemy.
6. We shall continue to harass the enemy with guerrilla tactics even if only one of us remains alive.
There is too much of Hiroshima in the Ukraine War, even for a casual observer, not to realize how serious this might turn out to be.
America used nuclear weapons on Japan and ended the second world war. Russia might use nuclear weapons on Ukraine and begin the third one.
What Goes On From Here.
Trying to predict what happens next if Russia takes the nuclear route or if it hopefully doesn't would contradict the epistemic humility I canvassed for at the beginning of this essay. It would also be a monumental waste of time because nobody knows.
At the very least, I expect that if it happens, it would be the end of international organizations. An international organization is based on the conceit that all the countries of the world can put aside their own interests to pursue global cooperation and peace. It's a lie but it has also worked out nicely so far. A nuclear strike would shatter that lie irrevocably.
Countries would begin fending for their own interests without cloaking it in diplomatic speak. I expect at least three countries ( Japan, South Korea, and Germany) to become nuclear powers as soon as possible. International alliances won't die but they will become smaller and more covert. East Asia, and not the Middle East, will become the world's number one conflict zone. The European Union will splinter into spheres of competing interests and Pro Russia sides will emerge. And America will do one of the two things it does best: either retreat into its own invulnerable shell once and for all, or launch a new war.
Who knows. I certainly don't. At this point, we have progressed beyond speculation into storytelling.
I don't know the mind of Putin. Anyone who has claimed to has mostly failed at this point. But his past is available to us and it does not make for easy reading.
So, Putin is clearly not afraid of escalating things beyond repair. He has never been throughout his long and sordid history. Whatever is restraining him right now, it is not fear.
The Turkey And The Chicken.
The philosopher and mathematician Bertrand Russell liked to tell a particular story about a turkey. Everyday, this turkey was fed and taken care of. It didn't matter what day it was, what the weather was, or what else had happened. The turkey would get fed to its heart's content and later sleep in blissful harmomy.
Like any good bayesian, the turkey wasn't stupid. He was always calculating his chances. He had heard tales of other turkeys being killed after all. So while the turkey was being treated like royalty, he was updating his chances of survival. Every day in which he didn't die was more evidence that nothing untoward would happen. He did this for so long that eventually the turkey was convinced he was finally safe. The day before Thanksgiving, he remarked to a neighbouring animal that he was safe and there was absolutely nothing to worry about.
The next day was thanksgiving and the turkey now appropriately fattened was slaughtered for a celebratory dinner.
There is another even more well-known story about an equally intelligent chicken. She was busy about enjoying her day when an acorn landed on her head. The chicken had no idea it was an acorn and didn't want to jump to conclusions. She asked everyone around her whether they had any idea of what had hit her on her head.
They were all equally clueless. She tested every possible hypothesis of what could have been responsible. There was no evidence for any of the hypotheses. So the chicken finally came to a respectable conclusion: the sky was falling and a piece of the sky had hit her on her head. After all, the clouds fell from the sky as rain, so why not parts of the sky itself.
So the chicken went around, warning everyone who would care to listen that they were all going to die once the sky fell in sufficient amounts. They all got very sad, abandoned their day-to-day lives, and began preparing for death.
This was until the squirrel confessed she had been running up a tree with some acorns and one of them had accidentally fallen on the chicken's head. It was all a waste of time.
So, which is it. Smug confidence of pointless fear? The end of the world as we know it or absolutely nothing to worry about? The Turkey or the Chicken?
Perhaps, as with the Ukraine War itself and the larger uncompleted story of humanity it falls under, it is too early to tell.